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Green Political Theory  
 
Forthcoming in Geoghegan, V. and Wilford, R. (eds), (2014), Political 
Ideologies, 4th edition (London: Routledge). 
 
John Barry 
 
Introduction  
 
Ecologism or green political theory is the most recent of schools of political thinking.  
On the one hand, it focuses on issues that are extremely old in politics and 
philosophical inquiry – such as the relationship between the human and nonhuman 
worlds, the moral status of animals, what is the ‘good life’, and the ethical and 
political regulation of technological innovation.  Yet on the other, it is also 
characterised as dealing with some specifically contemporary issues such as the 
economic and political implications of climate change, peak oil, overconsumption, 
resource competition and conflicts, and rising levels of global and national 
inequalities.   It is also an extremely broad school of political thought covering a wide 
variety of concerns, contains a number of distinct sub-schools of green thought (here 
sharing a similarity with other political ideologies) and combines normative and 
empirical scientific elements in a unique manner making it distinctive from other 
political ideologies.   
 
First a word about definitions.  There are a number of terms used to describe green 
political theory ranging from ‘ecologism’, to ‘environmentalism’ or ecological 
political theory or environmental political theory (Barry and Dobson, 2003).  This 
chapter uses the term ‘green political theory’ on the grounds that both ecological and 
environmental labels, while certainly conveying one of the key distinguishing features 
of green political theorising – namely its focus on both the material/metabolic 
dimensions of human-nonhuman relations as well as the ethical and political status of 
the nonhuman world – can offer a rather narrow understanding of green politics.  
What I mean by this is that ecologism, or environmental political theory, as a way of 
categorising green politics is too focused on these issues of nature and human-nature 
relations and does not, at least in my view, allow sufficient scope for the ‘non-
ecological’ and ‘non-nature related’ principles of green politics This is particularly the 
case in respect of understanding and appreciating the specifically intra-human 
dimensions of green political theory. 
 
There is a common distinction often made in the literature between 
‘environmentalism’ and ‘ecologism’ (Dobson, 2007), with environmentalism 
denoting a form of ‘single issue’ green politics solely concerned with, for instance, 
pollution and resource management, and ecologism denoting a fully fledged political 
ideology with views on non-resource and non-environmental concerns.  In this respect 
what is offered here is closer to ecologism than environmentalism, but nevertheless 
uses green political theory as the appropriate term since even ecologism conveys a 
definite sense (at least on first sight) that green politics is largely or exclusively 
concerned with the non-human world and human-nonhuman relations.  Thus while it 
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may seem to be simply a pedantic issue, this chapter uses ‘green political theory’ 
instead of ‘ecologism’ as a more appropriate, inclusive categorisation of green 
politics, which fully acknowledges the uniqueness of its focus on nature while also 
stressing its radical approach to the organisation of human social, economic and 
political relations, consistent, but not exclusively tied to or derived from its focus on 
the metabolism between humans and nature.   
 
Some Origins of Green Political Thinking  
 
Some origins of green theory can be identified and summarised:  
 
• the ‘romantic’ and negative reactions to the Industrial Revolution, from 
working class and peasant resistance to capitalism, mechanisation and the 
factory production system, the enclosure of the commons, and the despoliation 
of the countryside; 
• the positive reaction to the unfinished project of the French (democratic) 
Revolution; 
• a negative reaction to ‘colonialism’ and ‘imperialism’ in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, and a related concern with global ecological injustice, the 
‘ecological debt’ owed by the minority/’developed’ world to the 
majority/’underdeveloped’ world and minority/majority world relations of 
inequality and power; 
• the emergence of the science of ecology and Darwin’s evolutionary theory, 
and later the integration of science, ethics and politics in diagnosing and 
providing answers to socio-ecological and related problems; 
• issues around the resource, pollution and especially energy foundations for 
human social, economic and political organisation, lifestyles and realisable 
conceptualisations of the ‘good society’ and ‘good life’; 
• growing public perception of an ‘ecological crisis’ in the 1960s, claims of 
‘Limits to Growth’ from the 1970s onwards, and the emergence of ‘global 
environmental problems’ in the 1980s and 1990s, and peak oil and climate 
change in the early part of this century; 
• transcending the politics of ‘industrialism’ (organised on a left–right 
continuum) by a politics of ‘post-industrialism’ (beyond left and right); 
• increasing awareness of and moral sensitivity to our relations with the 
nonhuman world (from the promotion of ‘animal rights’ and animal welfare to 
ideas that the Earth is ‘sacred’ and/or has intrinsic value); 
• the integration of progressive social, political and economic policies with the 
politics of transition to  a sustainable society, principally the universal 
promotion of human rights, socio-economic equality, democratisation of the 
state and the economy.  (Barry, 2007) 
   
Of particular importance is the central concern of green theory and practice to 
overcome both the separation of ‘human’ from ‘nature’ and also the misperception of 
humans as above or ‘superior’ to nature. Green political theory can be seen as an 
attempt to bring humanity and the study of human society ‘down to earth’. The 
science of ecology played an important part in arguing that humans as a species of 
animal (that is, we are not just like animals, we are an animal species) are 
ecologically embedded in nature, and exist in a web-like relation to other species, 
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rather than being at the top of some ‘great chain of being’. It is crucial to note the 
significance of green political and social theory having a strong basis in the natural 
sciences (mainly ecology, evolutionary and environmental psychology, the biological 
life sciences and thermodynamics), because, as will be suggested below, this gives us 
a strong indication of what the ‘greening’ of social theory may involve.  
 
A second and related point, is that green social theory, in transcending the 
culture/nature split, begins its analysis based on a view of humans as a species of 
natural being, which like other species has its particular species-specific 
characteristics, needs and modes of flourishing (and non-flourishing). Central to green 
theory, unlike other forms of political theory, with the exception of feminism, is a 
stress on the ‘embodiedness’ of humans as ethically and politically significant.  
 
A third issue which green political theory raises is the way in which social-
environmental relations are not only important in human society, but also constitutive 
of human society. That is, one cannot offer a theory of society without making social-
environmental interaction, and the natural contexts and dimensions of human society, 
a central aspect of one’s theory. In its attention to the naturalistic bases of human 
society, the green perspective is ‘materialistic’ in a different and arguably much more 
fundamental way than within Marxist theory for example. Unlike the latter, green 
political theory concerns itself with the external and internal natural conditions of 
human individual and social life, whereas the ‘material base’ for Marx is primarily 
economic not natural.  Hence, a green understanding of the metabolism (a particularly 
evocative and appropriate term used by both greens and Marxists) includes the 
economic transformative process, but also more importantly the ecological, natural 
biodiversity, resource and energy flows and stocks that underpin all human economic 
activity.   The economy is thus of particular interest from a green perceptive since it is 
at the centre of the material metabolism between the human and non-human.  And as 
will be seen, a key feature of green political theory in this respect is the re-casting of 
how we understand the ‘economy’ and the ‘economic’. 
 
At the same time, this materialist reading of green social theory questions the ‘post-
materialist’ character often ascribed to green politics and issues, as given by 
Inglehart’s popular explanation for green politics as ‘post-materialist’ (Inglehart, 
1977) and, thereby, a mainly middle-class, European/Western phenomenon.  This 
characterisation of green politics is one that Marxists have drawn attention to and 
used to demonstrate the ‘anti-working class’ interests of green politics.  However, 
both this Marxist critique and Inglehart’s thesis fail to explain the ‘environmentalism 
of the poor’ (Martinez-Alier, 2001), the class, ethnic and race dynamics of the 
environmental justice movement (Schlosberg, 2009), or ‘resistance ecofeminism’ 
(Shiva, 1988).  The Eurocentric perspective of Inglehart’s analysis is of course 
limiting as is the empirically weak connection he makes between wealth/income 
levels and post-materialist values (Cudworth, 2003: 71) and his limiting of 
‘environmental concern’ to aesthetic/amenity rather than material or productive 
interests people have with their environments, both as resources (such as land) and a 
sink for pollutants/waste.   
 
A fourth issue to note about green theory is its moral claim about our relationship to 
the natural environment. What makes green moral theory distinctive is that it wishes 
to extend the ‘moral community’ beyond the species barrier to include our interaction 
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with the nonhuman world as morally significant, as well as extending the moral 
community temporally into the future in its focus on the rights of generations yet to be 
born and concerns, notably expressed in the idea of ‘sustainability’, of 
intergenerational justice.  
 
Waves of Green Political Theorising  
 
One way of understanding the development of green political theory is in terms of 
waves, much as feminism (see Chapter XXX) is often categorised in terms of its 
evolution. ‘First wave’ green political theory was primarily concerned with 
articulating the distinctiveness of ‘ecologism’ as an ideology and green political 
theory as a distinctive approach to politics (Porritt, 1984; Pepper, 1984; Spretnak and 
Capra, 1985; Dryzek, 1987; Dobson, 1990; Eckersley, 1992; Paehlke, 1989; 
Hayward, 1995). ‘Second wave’ ecological thought was characterised by a concern 
with debates between green political theory and other schools of thought such as 
liberalism, feminism, critical theory and socialism, as well as focusing on some key 
concepts within political thought such as democracy, justice, the state and citizenship 
(Barry, 1999; Mellor, 1997; Salleh, 1999; Wissenburg, 1998; de-Shalit, 1996; 
Doherty and de Geus, 1996; Sakar, 1999; Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 1996). 
 
Recent developments in what can be termed ‘third generation’ green political thought 
are noticeable for its explicitly interdisciplinary and applied focus. Indeed, on one 
level it is intellectually difficult to reflect on the many issues of concern to green 
political theory without venturing into and combining disciplines and bodies of 
knowledge outside politics, political science and political theory.  Related to this 
interdisciplinary focus, third generation scholarship on green politics and 
sustainability tends to be informed by a much wider range of disciplines integrated 
with practical, empirical research. Examples of third way green political theory 
include my own work, The Politics of Actually Existing Unsustainability (Barry, 
2012), Molly Scott-Cato’s Green Economics (Scott-Cato, 2008), Andy Dobson’s 
Environmental Citizenship (Dobson, 2003); Mathew Humphrey’s Ecological Politics 
and Democratic Theory (Humphrey, 2008); Graham Smith’s Deliberative Democracy 
and the Environment (Smith, 2003), Simon Hailwood’s How to be Green Liberal 
(Hailwood, 2004), or Tim Hayward’s Constitutional Environmental Rights (Hayward, 
2005).  Tim Jackson’s Prosperity without Growth (Jackson, 2009), has done much to 
publicise long articulated green economic ideas (especially in relation to questioning 
conventional ‘economic growth’), at a time when such ideas are needed more than 
ever in our public debate about and responses to the current global economic 
recession.  Or the research, publications and policy briefs from think tanks such as the 
new economic foundation - the incubator of many green political and economic ideas, 
ranging from its prescient and path breaking Green New Deal report in 2008 (Green 
New Deal Group, 2008), to the more recent publication of Boyle and Simms on The 
New Economics (Boyle and Simms, 2009).   
 
 
Green Politics, Applied Theory and State, Market and Community 
 
Green political theory can be understood as a form of applied political theory, and 
here it shares this feature with other ideologies all of which seek to make a difference 
and change the world or society according to their particular political principles.  The 
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task of an applied approach to political theory is to analyse some basic political or 
ethical principles – democracy, justice, and citizenship for example – and see what 
follows from them given the empirical ‘reality of the situation’ that faces humanity 
today, or a particular human society.  That is, to explore how public policy can best be 
implemented - consistent with principles and empirical facts -  as well as figuring out 
how best to institutionalise the achievement of those principles.  In particular, the 
institutional focus of applied political theory approach centers on the appropriate 
ordering and respective roles and relationships between what can be considered to be 
the three basic governance/political or order-producing institutions of human 
societies.  These are the state, the market and the community. 
 
The identification of these three institutions is important in that by employing them 
one can get a good, if basic and rough, idea of different political ideologies in terms 
of the relative weight and role accorded to state, market and community in both the 
ideology’s analysis of the current political situation and their suggestion for how it 
should be improved and what their ideal society would look like. For example, most 
‘right-wing’ political ideologies, such as conservatism or liberalism, tend to favour 
the free and self-regulating market i.e. capitalism, as the best institutional form for 
governing the human economy.  What this means is that they favour the free market 
for ordering and governing the human metabolism with the non-human world, 
including resources, energy sources, waste sinks.  On the other hand, some ‘left-wing’ 
political ideologies, such as Marxist forms of socialism, would tend to favour state-
based forms of economic organisation and regulation.  Here greens, in keeping with 
dominant strains of anarchism, differ in favouring the community as a preferred locus 
of economic (and political) organisation.   
 
Green political theory favours, and prioritises, the community and communal forms of 
economic, cultural and political organisation and regulation.  This can be seen in the 
long-standing green interest and support for initiatives based on the principle of 
‘small is beautiful’ (Schumacher, 1973) where appropriate; ‘human scale’ technology 
and less centralised forms of political democratic institutions (Sale, 1980);  a 
suspicion of bureaucratised and professionalised/elite modes of meeting human needs 
(Illich, 1971); more local, grassroots forms of economic and political initiatives such 
as Transition Towns (Hopkins, 2008); and support for more localised and cooperative 
forms of economic activity (Cato, 2008).  Perhaps the clearest instance of this 
privileging of the community is the strong preference for the ‘social economy’ over 
and above either market/private or state/public forms of economic life and associated 
notions of the economy being embedded in, rather than completely divorced from, 
human social life and social norms (Barry, 2012).   
 
From the perspective of green political theory, the state and market are therefore best 
regarded as instrumental to supporting community-based forms of political and 
economic organisation and ways of life.  That is, from a green political point of view 
we should judge, assess and think about the state and the market (and associated 
principles and ideas such as private property, modes of economic organisation and the 
democratic regulation of the state, and state-citizen relations) in relation to their 
contribution in ensuring that political, economic and cultural life is organised by, and 
at, the community level.  Thus, while most greens (with the exception of eco-
anarchists) do not reject the state, and while they are profoundly suspicious of the 
concentration and centralisation of power within and by the state, they do see a role 
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for a more democratised and decentralised state in regulating the market to prevent 
the latter from undermining key green values such as social solidarity, high levels of 
well-being, human scale connectedness and the intrinsic values of work (and here 
greens do not conflate work with formally paid employment).  Above all, there is a 
role for the state in regulating any market-based organisation of human economic 
relations to prevent the emergence and maintenance of high levels of socio-economic 
inequality, since the latter is not only corrosive of key green values - which are 
constitutive of community itself - but which, as Wilkinson and Pickett demonstrate 
(2008), inequalities undermine key aspects of the transition from unsustainability (see 
also Barry, 2012).      
 
Green Politics and Actually Existing Unsustainability 
 
While completely accepting the need for and importance of more abstract, 
conceptually based theorising, there is a major difference between debates about a 
theory or theories of justice (which dominate contemporary liberal political theory) 
and the fact that, sociologically speaking, it is injustice not justice that characterises 
the world. One gets a very different form of theorising when one begins from where 
we are in terms of conditions of injustice, rather than seeking to develop compelling 
and intellectually coherent – but abstract – benchmarks or criteria against which we 
can judge present day, real world conditions of injustice.  The fight against injustices 
is not necessarily the same as a fight for some positive conception of justice.  As 
Simon rightly suggests, ‘injustice has a different phenomenology from justice.  
Understanding injustice constitutes a separate theoretical enterprise from constructing 
a theory of justice....injustice takes priority over justice’ (Simon, 1995: xvii; Shklar, 
1990; Wolgast, 1987).  Using a similar line of argument there are good reasons for 
recasting green political theory as a politics of actually existing unsustainability rather 
than a politics for (future) sustainability.  This perspective implies that the analysis of 
actually existing unsustainability should take priority over the analysis of 
sustainability. 
 
A politics of unsustainability addresses our attention to the reality of what can be 
called actually existing unsustainability, and the identification of those underlying 
causes for the continuation of that unsustainability or unsustainabilities.   From this 
perspective then, the first aim of green politics ought to be to identify the drivers and 
causes of unsustainability and seek to reduce existing unsustainability as a 
precondition for the articulation and achievement of  future sustainability or to map 
some future sustainable development path (Barry, 2012).   
 
Indeed, we may have done better since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit - the first 
international articulation of ‘sustainability ‘and ‘sustainable development’ - if we had 
focused attention on a politics of actually existing unsustainability rather than 
sustainability.  The time and debate taken to develop an agreed conception of 
sustainability has actually ‘sustained unsustainability’ as it were.  One could be 
forgiven for thinking that from the point of view of those profiting and benefitting 
from the continuation of actually existing unsustainability, that the ideal way for this 
system to continue relatively unchanged, while acknowledging its unsustainability, 
would be to focus on the pressing and urgent need to develop a workable and agreed 
conception of sustainability and sustainable development to guide us, complete with 
associated policies and strategies.  This rather cynical/realistic view of the official 
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politics of ‘sustainable development’ is where the work of Blühdorn and others on 
‘simulative green politics’ connects with the conception of green political theory  
outlined in this chapter (Blühdorn, 2000; Blühdorn and Welsh, 2008).  It suggests that 
just as the rich will do everything to help the poor except get off their backs, likewise 
those benefitting from unsustainability (which simply put is the exploitation of people 
and planet), are willing to do everything to realise sustainability, except stop their 
unsustainable lifestyles and transform the underlying social and economic dynamics 
that cause unsustainability.  Think of the proliferation of the growing number of 
academic, government, NGO and corporate documents about ‘sustainability’ and 
‘sustainable development’.  What would such documents contain if, instead of being 
framed and focused around the future achievement of some understanding of 
sustainability, they were framed and focused around the reduction of unsustainability 
here and now?  What would the policy implications be of a strategy for reducing 
‘unsustainable development’?  
 
To return to this focus on actually existing unsustainability and the argument for the 
priority of an account of injustice over any theory of justice.  According to Simon, we 
can identify injustice without recourse to a theory of justice (that is injustice cannot be 
reduced to meaning the lack or absence of justice), largely through the ideas of 
suffering and harm.  As he puts it: 
 
It makes a difference whether we describe our political actions as part of a 
fight against injustice, against other people’s suffering, or as a contest for 
justice.  The two labels do not constitute different ways of talking about the 
same thing...Justice beckons us to create the positive in the future whereas 
injustice frantically yells at us to eradicate the negative in the present’ (Simon, 
1995: 1; emphasis added).  
 
An interesting and important point Simon makes concerning the separation of 
considerations of injustice from their attachment to justice, is that from a green 
perspective a critique of the current unsustainable economic system does not, and 
should not, depend for its validity on the specification of some positive sustainable 
alternative.  While from a political point of view, that is, persuading people of one’s 
position, one might wish to develop a worked out alternative, this should not be a 
requirement for the critique to be politically considered and taken seriously in public 
policy debate.  As he notes: 
 
the negative recommendation stands on its own, without the inclusion of a 
positive alternative...Requiring that negative recommendations depend upon 
positive alternatives has the effect of undermining the negative 
recommendations.  We need to listen to the negative recommendations, 
irrespective of whether the negative criticisms also contain positive proposals’ 
(Simon, 1995: 14; emphasis added).   
 
This prescription relates  to many green arguments concerning the need   to challenge 
practices and institutions that promote unsustainability on the grounds that it is their 
responsibility to disprove the charge of unsustainability, as opposed to green objectors 
having to prove unsustainability (usually based on some notion of sustainability).  
This is  a central issue of the precautionary principle (see O’Riordan and Jordan 
(1995),   the application of which is compatible with the politics of unsustainability 
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outlined here: namely,  in ‘turning the table’ in the debate by requiring proponents of 
the status quo to disprove unsustainability.   
 
As Simon notes, it is the identification of harm (which does not have to have any 
referent to a theory of justice or what a person is due under such a theory), that 
enables one to develop an account of injustice conceived as independent from an 
account of justice.  He is explicit in seeing the importance of the acceptance of a 
‘health metaphor’ in defending a theory of injustice.  For him, ‘Justice relates to 
injustice in the same way that health relates to disease.  We cannot have informative 
definitions or analyses of each specific disease only according to what form of health 
the disease rules out’ (Simon, 1995: 12).  It is because we can identify harm and 
suffering without recourse to a theory of justice, that we can say the experience of 
injustice cannot be reduce to the absence of being treated in accordance to some 
account of justice.   
 
Green Politics and Human Flourishing  
 
If we accept this health metaphor, this represents a distinctive green view of ethics 
and politics (Barry, 2012).  It enables us  to understand the urgency of actually 
existing unsustainability and its associated exploitation of people, the abuse of the 
planet and the continuing degradation of the non-human world. One of the features of 
this health/suffering/flourishing perspective, and perhaps the one that results in some 
being critical of its use, is its potential for abuse by whoever or whatever authority 
determines what is and what is not ‘human flourishing’.  This is a legitimate concern 
since anyone or any institution that determines your health can potentially do so 
without any reference to you – that is, such objective forms of determining what is 
good for people can fall foul of the ‘shoe pinching objection’.  Namely that only the 
person wearing the shoe can know if and where it pinches: this cannot be determined 
by some external authority.  It can have non-democratic results in that relations 
between people governed on the basis of ‘expert knowledge’ are usually (and often 
legitimately) non-democratic.  The classic example here is a patient’s relationship to 
her doctor – we do not typically view this relationship as one that necessarily has to 
be structured by democratic norms.  The application of democratic norms is usually 
viewed as inappropriate in this (and other similar cases).  However, notwithstanding 
these important considerations, I do not think that making a health, or suffering, or 
harm, focus central to one’s political position necessarily leads to such undemocratic 
and unjust results.  Another concern is ‘perfectionism’, which is the concern that such 
a quasi-objectively determined sense of human flourishing could result in non-
democratic, individual-insensitive intrusions which would ‘force’ people to ‘flourish’ 
along a particular pattern over which they had not control or to which they do not lend 
their consent or approval.   
 
A final concern is that this account of the human person, and the associated 
conception of human flourishing, is homogenous, i.e. there is one, determinate view 
of the ‘good life’ for humans.  This would mean a politics that reduced the variety of 
views of the good life available to individuals and groups.  One response to this 
(liberal) objection would be to point out the empirical experience of how 
contemporary liberal capitalist societies promote one dominant view of the good life, 
namely a consumerist one.  Against the backdrop of the crushing uniformity and 
homogeneity often attendant upon contemporary consumerist culture, my contention 
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is that there would be more, not less variety in views of the good in a post-growth, 
post-capitalist social order.  A shift away from the dominance of the ‘goods life’ 
(Doran, 2006), could open up more not less possibilities for a variety of forms of 
human flourishing.  Another response would be, since green politics does not require 
that people ‘be or think green’, or ‘be sustainable’ in some determinate sense, but 
rather that they stop or reduce ‘being unsustainable’, which is both less contentious, 
and does not have the liberty or pluralism-reducing effects of ‘forcing people to be 
sustainable’.  Relatedly, given the focus on structures and political economy dynamics 
that underpin green political economy, the issue in respect to unsustainability and its 
reduction is primarily structural and political, not necessarily to do with individual 
agents.  Therefore, while of course having an impact on individuals green politics is 
less interested (though not uninterested) in the behaviour of individuals, than in 
ensuring that what Rawls called the ‘basic structure of society’ does not contain 
structures that enable, encourage or oblige/force individuals to engage in actions and 
practices which perpetuate actually existing unsustainability.      
              
From the negative Aristotelian perspective outlined here, what a focus on human 
flourishing denotes is the determination, on a quasi-objective basis, of those features 
that undermine the range within which being a healthy person, viewed holistically, is 
possible.  The aim, therefore, of a green politics of actually existing unsustainability is 
the speedy removal of those features, structures, cultural norms, institutional 
arrangements of the present social order, which prevent the realisation of this range of 
human flourishing for as many people as possible.  Thus, the negative Aristotelianism 
here is not about the promotion of some narrow and determinate sense of the human 
good: that the good life necessarily requires active citizenship.  Rather it is, on the 
basis of our best available knowledge that we can specify those aspects of an 
individual’s particular social structure (social context, milieu, environment) that are 
actively undermining their realisation of that range of human flourishing.  Thus, this 
negative Aristotelianism of green politics tries to avoid or minimise the charge of 
‘perfectionism’ while retaining a quasi-objective account of the conditions of human 
flourishing to enable the determination and, hopefully removal or reduction, of those 
obstacles which constrain more people from realising that range of human flourishing.  
That is, the aim of a green republicanism of actually existing unsustainability is 
primarily negative and defensive; to reduce as much as possible those external and 
internal features preventing people from flourishing.1  Here, green political theory has 
affinities with both the emancipatory politics of critical theory and utopianism, though 
re-cast as a form of ‘concrete’ rather than ‘abstract utopianism’ (Barry, 2012).      
 
From the account of green political theory articulated here human flourishing can be 
understood in a quasi-objective manner, akin to trying to specify those features that 
together constitute a ‘healthy human’.  And a green politics of actually existing 
unsustainability suggests we need to begin out search by developing a view of the 
human person as someone who is both socially and ecologically embedded, 
                                                
1 An interesting policy application of this thinking is ‘choice editing’ (Levett, 2003), that is the 
deliberate removal of and reduction of choice in an area motivated by a desire to both removal socially 
or environmentally ‘bad’ options, but which also removes the stress most people feel when faced with 
a bewildering range of choices in a single area or product.  As he puts it, ‘Contrary to current rhetoric, 
an important job of government is to restrict choice.  The state stops us assaulting, robbing or cheating 
each other, with the great benefit that we can live in peace and security and do deals with strangers of 
unknown morals’ (Levett, 2008:11; emphasis added).  
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biologically embodied and dependent, biographically, at different points in his or her 
life.  In the ‘circumstances of unsustainability’ that currently prevail we need a 
conception of human flourishing - what it means to be a healthy human viewed 
holistically - that is cognisant of the finite planet and its resources.  This is why one 
short hand summary of green political goals is the achievement of ‘low carbon, high 
quality of life forms of human flourishing’.  In this way what is needed is to improve 
the ‘resource and eco-efficiency’ of human flourishing, not the eco-efficiency of 
conventional economic productivity and orthodox economic growth.  Or, rather, we 
can only make decisions and judgements about productivity and economic growth in 
relation to how they contribute to the primary goal of human flourishing.  How can 
we in short get maximum human flourishing while staying within the regenerative 
capacities and thresholds of the sustainable use of the various ecological resources of 
our finite planet?    
 
Thus, a key goal of this negative Aristotelianism within green politics is the removal 
of those external and internal obstacles preventing human flourishing.  So what are 
these?  We can identify the following from a green political theory perspective:  
 
o the narrowing of human identity and interests by debt-based 
consumerism and the deformities of human life due to poverty, 
insecurity, malnutrition;  
o the axiomatic presentation of orthodox, undifferentiated economic 
growth as a permanent rather than contingent feature of an economy;  
o increasing levels of socio-economy inequality;  
o the sequestering of our dependence natures and needs;  
o the corralling of ‘work’ into formally paid ‘employment’ and the 
imperatives for economic growth;  
o the gender inequality of necessary reproductive work;  
o the ‘crowding out’ of socially embedded forms of provisioning by the 
state and market.   
 
By removing these givens the outlines of a green conception of human flourishing 
begins to emerge: based on ‘post-consumerist’, but not anti-materialist, forms of 
human identity; the centrality of public policy based on the identification of 
thresholds beyond which specific macro-economic policies, such as economic growth 
diminish rather than add to meeting human needs and flourishing; establishing ‘rough 
equality’ between people; fully recognising our vulnerable and dependence natures as 
they change over a lifetime; focusing on promoting work and not just orthodox 
‘employment’; greater recognition and support for more gender equal reproductive 
work; and the enhancing of the social economy/convivial economy and solidarity, 
alongside reformed state and market forms of economic production and provisioning.   
 
This focus on actually existing unsustainability can also be connected to viewing 
green politics as a form of ‘concrete utopianism’: a politics of hope for a self-
transforming present, one orientated towards the here and now (hence its ‘applied 
theory’ character).  The movement away from unsustainability is perhaps more 
practical as there is more chance of political agreement on what is unsustainable than 
what is ‘sustainable’, much in the same way that Simon notes,: ‘We can find 
agreement more readily over what constitutes injustice than over what constitutes 
justice’ (Simon, 1995: xvii).  Thus, there may be strategic reasons why we might want 
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to consider re-casting green politics as a politics of actually existing unsustainability, 
thereby improving its chances of making a political difference.  Green politics is 
vulnerable, as are all oppositional and radical perspectives, of both an impatience for 
change and a danger of ‘the perfect becoming the enemy of the good’.  What this can 
mean is that aiming for the ‘perfect’ is aiming for some sense of sustainability where 
all the inter-related issues of the internal relations between people, and between 
people, place and planet have been ‘solved’.  The ‘good’ here is the ‘good enough’, 
the identification and removal or reduction of those external-structural and internal 
features of the human condition in the here and now, that are systematically causing 
harm, suffering and exploitation and thus preventing human (and non-human) 
flourishing.     
 
On the one hand, there is no ‘solution’ that ‘sustainability’ represents, in that 
(especially from an ecological perspective) any equilibrium ‘solution’ will always be 
provisional and dynamic.  On the other, a green politics focused on the achievement 
of sustainability, as indicated above, is liable to spend too long and expend too much 
energy on developing some agreed account of sustainability, to the detriment of 
devoting time and attention to tackling unsustainability.  That is, a politics of 
sustainability can constrain movement on reducing currently existing unsustainability, 
since this way of thinking means that we cannot tackle unsustainability until we have 
a clear and agreed sense of sustainability.   While harsh, I think this is a reasonable 
overview of the debate and politics around ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable 
development’ since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992.   
 
A green politics orientated around analysing and reducing actually existing 
unsustainability also seems to have the advantage of perhaps mobilising people.  
What I mean by this is that often when both the realities and causal dynamics of 
actually existing unsustainability are revealed to people, they connect more easily to 
the emotional and motivational resources of injustice, than the more distant and cold 
dispositions of both sustainability and justice.  A major issue here is that in the 
contemporary world the realities of unsustainability, and their causal relations, are 
systematically ‘sequestered’ and occluded under contemporary patterns of industrial 
globalisation (Barry, 2012).  A key feature of green politics is thus ‘de-sequestering’ 
of such relations, and in that way (re)politicising them (Barry and Ellis, 2010).  In 
‘seeing’ the realities and causal relations of unsustainability - the exploitation of 
vulnerable people in other parts of the world, the suffering of people or animals, the 
sheer injustice of needless deaths - the emotional and psychological response to these 
need little encouragement.  Sympathy and empathy are entirely ethically appropriate 
and much needed ways of looking at the world, especially a world so full of needless 
suffering as ours.  In industrial societies, there are reasons other than cost, aesthetics 
and health and safety why abattoirs do not have glass walls.  We thus may have a 
better chance of mobilising people around a politics of actually exiting 
unsustainability than appealing to a sense of sustainability.  
 
But the movement away from unsustainability is more ‘practical’ in another sense.  It 
may turn out that making societies less unsustainable is a matter of not doing 
something than doing something new, such as consuming less, both commodities and 
energy.  This is another central feature of green political theory, the sense that the 
achievement of a less unsustainable, green society, is not so much about getting from 
‘here’ to ‘there’, but about ‘letting go’ and showing that it is the unsustainable ‘here’ 
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that is utopian and unrealistic that needs to be challenged (Mellor, 1995).  This does 
not mean that such a transition is easy, but it does indicate that of more concern for a 
politics of actually existing unsustainability are that the state and public discourse 
should be perhaps directed more towards eliminating existing forms of consumer 
‘lock-in’ to unsustainable and perhaps non-well-being enhancing practices, than 
necessarily to unleashing the power of the wind or the atom.  That is, reducing 
actually existing unsustainability may be more about reducing and scaling back 
existing practices than proposing something new.   
 
‘People Cannot Stand Too Much Reality’: The Emergence of ‘Hard 
Green’ Ecological Realism 
 
The anthropologist Marshall Sahlins pointed out that every human culture (or indeed 
non-human culture for that matter) is a ‘gamble played with nature’ (Sahlins, 1985: 
ix), and like any gamble can be won or lost.  One of the contemporary Zeitgeists we 
can observe is an interlocking and complex sense of anxiety about the future.   This 
Zeitgeist is principally driven by fears about life in a climate changed and carbon 
constrained world in the aftermath of ‘peak oil’, dangerous climate change, and 
multiplied under the current global economic crisis since 2008.  It is an anxiety that 
our current globalised carbon-fuelled capitalist system is coming to the end of the 
line.  This chapter is written against the backdrop of a profound (and disturbing) sense 
of growing doom and frustration at the lack of progress on the social mobilisation, or 
institutional planning, for the  transition to a low-carbon, or post-carbon society and 
economy.  And for greens this transition is inevitable.  
 
However, what is striking about some recent thinking on unsustainability of current 
dominant ways of life are those voices, discourses and works which one might 
categorise as ‘ecological realist’.  The ‘hard green’ analyses tend often to paint the 
near-future of large sections of humanity in extremely negative and stark terms.  
Think of Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, together with the peer-reviewed science of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and mix in the complete failure of 
political leadership by the majority of the most powerful countries on the planet and 
mainstream political parties.  This hard green discourse is peppered with terms such 
as ‘peak oil’, ‘climate chaos’, life in a ‘carbon constrained world’, ‘climate and food 
(in)security’, climate-imposed ‘triage’. Moreover, it is gripped by a profound sense of 
urgency, such as the new economics foundation announcement in October 2008, that 
we had ‘100 months to save the planet’ (new economics foundation, 2008).  This 
ecological realist analysis articulates a green storyline that, on the face of it, could not 
be more removed from an idealist, hope-filled account of green political theory.   
 
The sheer scale, rapidity and incontrovertible evidence of humanity becoming more 
‘locked-into’ unsustainability, the liquidation of the planet’s life support systems and 
the negative impact on the nonhuman community of life on the planet, is matched 
only by the prevarication of governments and other influential groups, especially 
business, and a passive consumer population.  In particular, we could point to large 
corporations and other key sectors of the business community that have lobbied 
actively against policies and legislation to reduce pollution, funded climate change 
denial, engaged in ‘greenwash’ instead of cleaning up their production processes, and 
thereby maintained unsustainability.  Or, relating it to Blühdorn’s work discussed 
above, we could examine the ‘cognitive dissonance’ displayed by millions of citizens 
 13 
who proclaim to know about and accept that their energy-intense, high-consumption 
and high-mobility lifestyles (and associated economic system and technological 
infrastructure) are the root causes of global and local ecological breakdown, but who 
either refuse or are unable to change their lifestyles to enable ‘one planet living’.  As 
Schellenberger and Nordhaus put it, ‘while public support for action on global 
warming is wide it is also frighteningly shallow’ (Schellenberger and Nordhaus, 
2006: 9).  George Monbiot observes: 
 
As people in the rich countries – even the professional classes – begin to wake 
up to what science is saying, climate change denial will look as stupid as 
Holocaust denial or the insistence that AIDS can be cured by beetroot.  But 
our response will be to demand that the government acts while hoping it 
doesn’t.  We will wish our governments to pretend to act.  We get the moral 
satisfaction of saying what we know to be right, without the discomfort of 
doing it.  My fear is that the political parties in most rich nation countries have 
already recognized this.  They know we want tough targets, but that we also 
want those targets to be missed.  They know that we will grumble about their 
failure to curb climate change, but that we will not take to the streets.  They 
know that nobody ever rioted for austerity (Monbiot, 1997: 41-42; emphasis 
added).  
 
So far, so good for ‘simulative green politics’ (Blühdorn and Welsh, 2008; Blühdorn, 
2000), which constitutes an updated version of St. Augustine’s request that ‘God 
grant me chastity and temperance, but not just yet’.   
 
In response to Monbiot’s reasonable observation, green political theory does, 
however, suggest that people may ‘riot for their own happiness’. Seen from a negative 
Aristotelian perspective, what they may riot for is the removal of demonstrable 
obstacles to human (and non-human) flourishing.   As indicated earlier, green politics 
argues that the case for ‘post-growth’ rests on the argument that it is possible to 
simultaneously achieve a ‘low carbon’, low resource use but ‘high well-being’ 
society.  This offers a far more positive and attractive vision of a sustainable society 
than those (invariably non-greens) who present a green or sustainable society in terms 
of a discourse of ‘loss’, ‘sacrifice’ and/or ‘regress’ (Meyer and Maniates, 2010).  In 
many respects, what greens seek is to promote the serious consideration that orthodox 
‘economic growth’ has largely ‘done its job’ in the developed world (Wilkinson and 
Pickett, 2009).  And further, that its continuation as an uncontested cultural myth, 
state imperative, or as the underpinning of our modern ‘social contact’ in high carbon, 
high consumption societies, is systematically undermining human well-being, as well 
as liquidating the life-supporting systems of the planet.  What a post-growth position 
needs to present is a vision of a better, improved and more advanced society.  One in 
which social innovation is as important as technological innovation, where time 
begins to replace money and commodities, where sufficiency replaces maximisation 
and where ‘economic security’ for all replaces unequally distributed economic 
growth.  It is a better world, not some impoverished, regressive or indeed abstract 
utopian/dystopian vision of the future.  It is the outworkings of a self-transforming 
present, hence its ‘concrete utopian’ character, with most of the necessary 
technological, social and indeed economic practices and innovations already in 
existence and ready to be mobilised.  That most of these are small-scale, under-
recognised, or un-recognised does not detract from their importance and the powerful 
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fact that they do exist. All that is required, and of course this is a big ‘all’, is the 
political will, personal and collective courage, to learn about and experiment with 
them, and explore new ways of living more lightly on the planet.  Particularly for 
those in the ‘overdeveloped’ world, we are asked to slim down not starve ourselves in 
order to address actually existing unsustainability.  The issue is this: in the context of 
the inevitable (and hopefully ‘just’) transition to a less unsustainable society, it is not 
what we may lose that is moot, but what we gain. 
 
Given the centrality of the ‘limits to growth’ to any understanding of green politics, 
an ecological realist discourse could be viewed as the return to, or vindication of, that 
earlier green analysis and discourse in a new guise (Meadows et al, 1972).  While 
some critics at the time dismissed the limits to growth report as ‘Malthus with a 
computer’ (Freeman, 1973), this new and improved ecological realist perspective 
could be viewed as ‘limits to growth with PowerPoint’, and improved earth systems 
science.  Contemporary examples of this updated version of limits to growth (usually 
we a central focus on climate change or peak oil), include Jared Diamond’s Collapse: 
How Societies Choose to Succeed or Fail (Diamond, 2006), Thomas-Homer Dixon’s 
The Upside of Down (Homer-Dixon, 2006), Alister McIntosh’s Hell and High Water: 
Climate Change, Hope and the Human Condition (McIntosh, 2008), Derrick Jensen’s 
The Culture of Make-Believe (Jensen, 2002), the Odums’ A Prosperous Way Down 
(Odum and Odum, 2001), James Howard-Kunstler’s The Long Emergency (Howard-
Kunstler, 2005) and Thomas Friedman’s Hot, Flat and Crowded (Friedman, 2008), 
have complemented documentaries such as Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth and 
Leonardo di-Caprio’s Eleventh Hour, extending to the less well known What a Way to 
Go: Life at the End of Empire, The End of Suburbia, Escape from Suburbia and A 
Crude Awakening: The Oil Crash or documentaries such as the 2009 UK based 
Channel 4 production,  Life after People.   
 
Other indications of this ecological realism include (in the UK and Ireland) the 
emergence of initiatives’ such as the ‘Dark Mountain’ project founded by ‘recovering 
environmentalists’ (Hine and Kingsnorth, 2010), the growth and more general 
acceptance of the analyses of the once marginal ‘peak oil movement’, to the 
emergence of what may be termed ‘collapse’ authors and thinkers such as Dimity 
Orlov (Orlov, 2011) and David Korowicz (Korowicz, 2010). As Thomas Friedman, 
notes,  
 
The world also has a problem: It is getting hot, flat, and crowded...In 
particular, the convergence of hot, flat, and crowded is tightening energy 
supplies, intensifying the extinction of plants and animals, deepening energy 
poverty, strengthening petro-dictatorships, and accelerating climate change.  
How we address these interwoven global trends will determine a lot about the 
quality of life on earth in the twenty-first century (Friedman, 2008: 5).   
 
It’s not just raining reports about our rapidly deteriorating ecological life-support 
system, it is also raining films, documentaries, pod casts, blogs and YouTube clips.  
 
While this corpus of books and films have popularised green thinking and certainly 
raised awareness of our unsustainability, they have also contributed to rendering 
green politics in a negative and unappealing frame (Schellenberger and Nordhaus, 
2006).  One of the main points they make in their ‘immanent critique’ of the US 
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environmental movement is how counter-productive it is to stress and amplify 
environmental problems (particularly within a technocratic or technological frame), 
without seeking to outline an attractive and compelling vision which attaches itself to 
peoples’ values and aspirations. Simply put, the green movement has been and 
continues to be extremely good at highlighting the problems (and indeed finding 
innovative ways to do so), but less good at articulating its vision for a less 
unsustainable society, or how the principle of ‘sustainability’ can relate to a positive 
future.  Perhaps one answer lies, as suggested above, in the green movement moving 
beyond a ‘sustainability’ frame to focusing on becoming a politics of ‘actually 
existing unsustainability’.     
 
James Lovelock is perhaps the most well-know environmentalist to capture this 
ecological realist mood.  His most recent view, in his latest book, The Vanishing Face 
of Gaia: A Final Warning (Lovelock, 2009), claims that there is no point in trying 
renewable energy, CO2 emissions trading systems or attempts to negotiate 
international treaties on reducing CO2, recycling or any of the other usual 
components of  ‘sustainable development’.  Lovelock foresees crop failures, drought, 
death on an enormous scale and massive social disruption right across the globe.  The 
population of this hot, barren world could shrink from about seven billion to one 
billion by 2100 as people compete for ever-scarcer resources.  As he put it in an 
interview, ‘It will be death on a grand scale from famine and lack of water. It could be 
a reduction to a billion (people) or less’ (Griffiths, 2009).  According to Lovelock the 
human species should be ideally adopting a clear ‘survivalist’ perspective and 
investing in efforts to create safe havens in areas which will escape the worst effects 
of climate change.  He puts it bluntly: “we have to stop pretending that there is any 
possible way of returning to that lush, comfortable and beautiful Earth we left behind 
some time in the 20th century” (Lovelock, 2009: 68).  And in an even more chilling 
statement:  ‘The Earth, in its but not our interests may be forced to move to a hot 
epoch, one where it can survive, though in a diminished and less habitable state. If, as 
is likely, this happens, we will have been the cause’ (ibid: 3; emphasis added).   
 
Other, more ‘post-humanist’ but equally pessimistic/realistic writers such as John 
Gray, have rushed to celebrate and endorse Lovelock.  In a review of Lovelock’s 
book he writes:  
 
Gaia has no particular concern for humans, and will not be propitiated by 
empty gestures such as carbon trading or limits on air traffic.  What is needed, 
in fact, is virtually the opposite of the standard Green mix of wind turbines 
and organic farms, which could at best enable an overblown human population 
to eke a precarious living from an overtaxed Earth.  If there is a sustainable 
future it is in a compact, high-tech civilisation with far fewer people (Gray, 
2009: 1).  
 
We can discern here the outlines of a new vision of a ‘sustainable society’, and one 
markedly at odds with the various accounts that pepper green political theory.   
 
Gray’s curt and cursory dismissal of green politics as wildly utopian i.e. not only 
unrealistic but dangerous and counterproductive – and   therefore useless as a guide to  
our action and thinking – is matched by an equally provocative suggestion that we 
should concentrate on are policies for a ‘sustainable retreat’ in the face of inevitable 
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ecological degradation and resource collapse (Lovelock, 2005; Gray, 2006).   This 
vision is a ‘hard ecological’ view and has clear resonances with certain Malthusian 
strains within green politics (Barry, 2007a; 1999b).  It is a vision of a technological 
‘survivalist’ society, one which is orientated towards saving what elements of 
civilisation we can.  It is basically a vision of sustainable society in which we have 
nuclear power, energy from waste incinerators, genetically engineered crops and 
medicines, centralised power production, big cities and urban conurbations (though 
perhaps relocated inland to escape the rising seas), but at the price of social progress, 
justice and democracy.  It is a techno-optimistic progressive sustainable society that is 
at one and the same time socially regressive.  A low carbon China in 100 years 
perhaps.    
 
Another prominent author here is Jeffrey Sachs, director of Columbia University’s 
Earth Institute, who in his 2007 BBC Reith Lectures follows Giddens, Gray and 
Lovelock (and Al Gore), in promoting a techno-centric and techno-optimistic vision 
for approaching the challenges we face.  For Sachs, the solution to our current ‘triple 
crunch’ of climate crisis, economic meltdown and energy insecurity (Green New Deal 
Group, 2008), is not ‘a massive cutback in our consumption levels or our living 
standards’ but ‘smarter living...to find a way for the rest of the world...to raise their 
own material conditions as well’ (Sachs, 2007).  At times it is hard to know which is 
the more unsettling: the cosy and comforting accounts of reformist ‘optimists’ such as 
Sachs, Gore and Giddens, or the shocking and frightening views of radical 
‘pessimists’ such as Lovelock, Demitri Orlov (Orlov, 2011), James Howard Kunstler 
(Kunstler, 200 ) and David Kowowicz (2010).     
 
The solutions suggested by such ‘hard ecologists’ are, in a very important respect, at 
odds with green political theory. Not just in the obvious sense that many of the 
solutions proposed are antithetical to green principles, not least their authoritarian 
character. An equally significant way in which such solutions are inconsistent with 
green political theory is that they are often non-political techno-fixes, and in so doing 
present the analysis of, and transition from, unsustainability in ways that resolutely 
avoid the quintessentially political (including ethical) causes of and therefore 
responses to unsustainability. However, there is a very significant issue all these 
writers raise, and one central to green politics.  That issue in a word is vulnerability.  
What all of these gloomy/realist/hard ecological analyses share is a profound sense of 
the vulnerability of humanity, particular human lifestyles and ways of life to natural 
limits and resource, energy or sink scarcities.  For this reason, vulnerability is central 
to green politics, and here perhaps sharing much with feminist political thinking on 
this foundational issue.   
 
Conclusion  
 
What we can say is that the analyses outlined by the new ‘ecological realism’ exposes 
the fundamental vulnerability of modern technologically-advanced industrial societies 
to a spectrum of problems ranging from climate change, food production, water and 
energy insecurity to the epidemics of obesity and declining mental health and well-
being within an increasingly climate changed, crowded, profoundly unequal, 
unsustainable and carbon constrained world (Barry, Mol and Zito, 2013; Barry, 2012).   
Yet unlike hard greens, the dominant trend within green political theory begins from 
the position that there is little to be gained from the continuing pursuit of the 
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‘malestream’ technological fantasy of invulnerability, control and mastery over 
nature.  This project and orientation to the world based on control, human 
invulnerability and domination of the earth, as critical theorists such as Horkheimer, 
Adorno, Fromm and Marcuse have long since pointed out, leads not to liberation and 
emancipation but wage and consumer enslavement (of self) and exploitation (of 
others, including nonhuman others).  The fantasy of invulnerability, control and 
conquest culminates in what Marcuse brilliantly diagnosed as the ‘repressive 
tolerance’ and disfigured subjectivities of liberal democracy within capitalism 
(Marcuse, 1964).  
 
In many respects green political theory is faced with providing analyses and responses 
to multiple socio-ecological dilemmas.  This context for green politics has been 
outlined by Thomas Homer-Dixon, and his contention in a New York Times op-ed 
article in 2010, that: 
 
Policy makers need to accept that societies won’t make drastic changes to 
address climate change until such a crisis hits.  But that doesn’t mean there’s 
nothing for them to do in the meantime.  When a crisis does occur, the 
societies with response plans on the shelf will be far better off than those that 
are blindsided.  The task for national and regional leaders, then, is to develop a 
set of contingency plans for possible climate shocks — what we might call, 
collectively, Plan Z.  We need a much more deliberate Plan Z, with detailed 
scenarios of plausible climate shocks; close analyses of options for emergency 
response by governments, corporations and nongovernmental groups; and 
clear specifics about what resources — financial, technological and 
organizational — we will need to cope with different types of crises. (Homer-
Dixon, 2010; emphasis added) 
 
We are facing inevitable ecological, resource and socio-economic challenges and we 
are singularly unprepared for them.  At the very least we should be thankful for these 
‘hard greens’ for both reminding us of the fragility and contingency of our current 
civilisation and ways of life, and for forcing a response to the often grim and tough 
issues and scenarios they raise.  Above all else, green political theory takes from them 
the importance, noted by Homer-Dixon, of the need for societies to plan for a number 
of future scenarios as well as actively taking steps to avoid the most negative ones.   
 
This is the promise of recasting and understanding green political theory as a politics 
of actually existing unsustainability.  In some ways, this take on the ‘hard greens’ is 
actually closer to the ‘soft green’ position outlined by E.F. Schumacher when he 
wrote, ‘We never know when the winds of change will blow, but when they do we 
must always have our sails at the ready’ (in Rosen, 2002: 181).  To continue this line 
of thought, green politics could be said to be premised on the hope contained in the 
Chinese proverb, ‘When the winds of change come some people build walls, others 
build windmills’.  
 
 
Further reading 
 
Short, introductory overviews of green political theory can be found in J. Barry, 
‘Environmentalism’, in Axtmann, R. (ed), (2002); J. Barry, and A. Dobson, ‘Green 
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Political Theory: A Report’, in Kukathas, C. & Gaus, G. (eds), (2003); J. Barry, 
‘Green Political Theory’ in Barry, J. and Frankland, E.G. (eds) (2001);  S. Young The 
Politics of the Environment (1992), R. Garner, Environmental Politics (1995); E. 
Cudworth’s Environment and Society (2003) and  
Classic, early and foundational accounts of ecological/green thinking or green ideas 
can be found in R. Carson’s Silent Spring (1961); E.F. Schumacher, Small is 
Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered (1973); E. Mishan, The Costs of 
Economic Growth (1968); D. Meadows, D. Meadows, and J. Randers, The Limits to 
Growth (1972); I. Illich, Tools for Conviviality (1973).   
 
Good accounts of ‘first wave’ green political theory include J. Porritt, Seeing Green: 
The Politics of Ecology Explained (1984); D. Pepper, The Roots of Modern 
Environmentalism (1984); C. Spretnak and F. Capra, Green Politics: The Global 
Promise (1985); J. Dryzek, Rational Ecology (1987); A. Dobson, Green Political 
Thought (1990); R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward and 
Ecocentric Approach (1992); R. Paehlke, Environmentalism and the Future of 
Progressive Politics (1989); T. Hayward, Ecological Thought: An Introduction 
(1995); L. Martell Nature and Society: An Introduction (1994), R. Goodin, Green 
Political Theory (1992); J. Kassiola The Death of Industrial Civilization (1990); P. 
Dickens, Society and Nature (1992); T. Benton, Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal 
Rights and Social Justice (1993); K. Lee, Social Philosophy and Ecological Scarcity 
(1989); A. Dobson and P. Lucardie, The Politics of Nature (1993). 
 
‘Second wave’ green politics includes work such as J. Barry, Rethinking Green 
Politics (1999); J. O’Neill, Ecology, Policy and Politics: Human Well-Being and the 
Natural World (1993); M. Mellor, Towards a Feminist, Green Socialism (1997); A. 
Salleh, Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx and the Postmodern (1999); T. Luke,  
(1999) Capitalism, Democracy, and Ecology and Ecocritique (1997), M. Wissenburg, 
Green Liberalism (1998); A. de-Shalit, Why Posterity Matters (1995); B. Doherty and 
M. de Geus, Democracy and Green Political Thought (1996); S. Sakar, Eco-Socialism 
or Eco-Capitalism? (1999); W. Lafferty and J. Meadowcroft, Democracy and the 
Environment (1996); B. Baxter, Ecologism: an Introduction (1999); J. Radcliffe, 
Green Politics: Dictatorship or Democracy? (2000); A. Carter, A Radical Green 
Political Theory (1999). 
 
Examples of ‘third wave’ green political thinking include J. Barry, The Politics of 
Actually Existing Unsustainability (2012); A. Dobson Citizenship and the 
Environment (2003); A. Dobson, Green Political Thought, 4th edition (2007); M. 
Humphrey, Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory (2008); M. Woodin and C. 
Lucas, Green Alternatives to Globalisation: A Manifesto (2004); J. Barry and R. 
Eckersley, The Nation-State and the Global Ecological Crisis (2005); G. Smith, 
Deliberative Democracy and the Environment (Smith, 2003), R. Eckerlsey, The 
Green State (2004); S. Hailwood, How to be Green Liberal (2004); T. Hayward, 
Constitutional Environmental Rights (2005); D. Schlosberg, Defining Environmental 
Justice (2009); P. Cannavò, The Working Landscape (2007);   
 
The growth in green political theory’s turn to critics of capitalism and orthodox 
economics and the development of a distinct account of green political economy can 
be found in the following: M. Scott-Cato, Green Economics (2008); M. Scott-Cato 
The Bioregional Economy: Land, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness (2012); T. 
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Jackson, Prosperity without Growth (2009); D. Boyle and A. Simms, The New 
Economics (2009); J. Schor, Plenitude: The New Economics of True Wealth (2010); 
B. McKibben, Deep Economy (2007).    
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